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ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
Interim State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #6555 
 
JENNY C. SWINFORD 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #9263 
P.O. Box 2816 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 334-2712 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) 
      ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent,  ) NOS.  43493 & 43494 
      ) 
v.      ) CANYON COUNTY NOS.  
      ) CR 2014-11002, CR 2014-11016 
JASON ZANE GARNER,   )  
      ) APPELLANT’S  
 Defendant-Appellant.  ) REPLY BRIEF 
________________________________) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Jason Zane Garner was on probation for two drug offenses and stalking. The 
district court found that Mr. Garner violated three terms of his probation after an 
evidentiary hearing. The district court then revoked his probation and executed his 
aggregate sentence of ten years, with six years fixed. Mr. Garner timely appealed from 
district court’s amended judgment and commitment. 
 In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Garner argued that the district court erred by revoking 
his probation. First, he contended that the district court lacked substantial and 
competent evidence to find two of Mr. Garner’s alleged probation violations were 
“willful,” as required by I.C.R. 33(f). He asserted that the case must be remanded for a 
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“willfulness” determination. He also asserted that the case must be remanded because 
it was not clear from the record that the district court would have revoked probation but 
for its erroneous findings. Second, Mr. Garner argued that the district court abused its 
discretion by revoking probation, assuming in arguendo the sufficiency of the evidence 
for the violations. 
 This Reply Brief addresses the State’s argument that the requirement in I.C.R. 
33(f) of a “willful” probation violation is in conflict with the statutes governing probation 
violations and therefore of no effect. 
  
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Garner’s Appellant’s Brief. (Revised App. Br., pp.1–3.) They are incorporated 
herein by reference. 
 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err by revoking Mr. Garner’s probation and executing his underlying 
aggregate sentence of ten years, with six years fixed? 
 
 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Revoking Mr. Garner’s Probation And Executing His 
Underlying Aggregate Sentence Of Ten Years, With Six Years Fixed 
 
 In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argues that the statutes governing probation 
violations control the district court’s decision to revoke probation and do not require a 
finding of willfulness prior to revocation. (Respt. Br., pp.4–12.) Contrary to the State’s 
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interpretation, the statutes and I.C.R. 33(f)1 are not in conflict. The statutes and I.C.R. 
33(f) can be interpreted in harmony with each other. Interpreted as such, the statutes 
and I.C.R. 33(f) prohibit the district court from revoking probation unless it finds the 
violation was willful. 
 The three relevant statutes are I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603, and 20-222.2 Idaho 
Code § 19-2602 states: 
If it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the terms and conditions 
upon which the defendant was placed on probation by the court or any of 
them have been violated or for any other cause satisfactory to the court, 
the court may, at any time within the longest period for which the 
defendant might have been originally sentenced by judgment of the court, 
issue a bench warrant for the rearrest of the defendant. 
 
I.C. § 19-2602. This statute authorizes the district court to issue a bench warrant to 
arrest the defendant for any violation of the terms and conditions of probation. Next, 
I.C. § 19-2603 states: 
When the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and 
conditions of probation, it may, if judgment has been withheld, pronounce 
any judgment which it could originally have pronounced, or, if judgment 
was originally pronounced but suspended, revoke probation. The time 
such person shall have been at large under such suspended sentence 
shall not be counted as a part of the term of his sentence. The defendant 
shall receive credit for time served from the date of service of a bench 
warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to believe the 
defendant has violated a condition of probation, for any time served 
following an arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20-227, Idaho 
Code, and for any time served as a condition of probation under the 
withheld judgment or suspended sentence. 
 
                                            
1 I.C.R. 33(f) was previously codified at I.C.R. 33(e). Compare I.C.R. 33(e) (West 2014), 
with I.C.R. 33(f) (West 2015). 
2 The State asserts that Mr. Garner failed to “even mention[ ]” these statutes. (Respt. 
Br., p.8.) However, Mr. Garner cited these statutes on page three of his Revised 
Appellant’s Brief. (Revised App. Br., p.3.)  
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I.C. § 19-2603. Relevant here, this statute provides that the district court “may” revoke 
probation “[w]hen the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and 
conditions of probation.” Finally, I.C. § 20-222 states: 
At any time during probation or suspension of sentence, the court may 
issue a warrant for violating any of the conditions of probation or 
suspension of sentence and cause the defendant to be arrested. 
Thereupon the court, after summary hearing may revoke the probation 
and suspension of sentence and cause the sentence imposed to be 
executed, or may cause the defendant to be brought before it and may 
continue or revoke the probation, or may impose any sentence which 
originally might have been imposed at the time of conviction. In making a 
determination to continue or revoke probation and suspension of 
sentence, the court shall consider the defendant's risks and needs and 
options for treatment in the community. 
 
I.C. § 20-222(2). Similar to I.C. §§ 19-2602 and 19-2603, I.C. § 20-222 authorizes the 
district court to issue a warrant for a violation of “any” probation condition. It further 
provides that the district court “may” revoke probation “after summary hearing.” 
 Primarily relying on I.C. § 20-222, the State asserts that the district court may 
revoke a defendant’s probation for “violating any of the conditions of probation.” 
I.C. § 20-222 (emphasis added). (Respt. Br., p.6.) This assertion is contrary to the plain 
language of the statute. Idaho Code § 20-222 allows the district court to “issue a 
warrant for violating any of the conditions of probation.” I.C. § 20-222(2) (emphasis 
added). Under this statute, the district court has broad authority to issue a warrant 
without a determination that the alleged violation was willful. Any alleged violation will 
suffice. Idaho Code § 19-2602 is consistent with this wide latitude to issue a warrant. It 
too allows the district court to issue a bench warrant if the district court is satisfied that 
the defendant has violated “any” term or condition of probation. I.C. § 19-2602. Thus, 
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while these statutes allow the district court to issue a warrant for any violation, they do 
not allow the district court to revoke probation for any violation.  
 Further, the directives in Idaho Code §§ 19-2603 and 20-222 on probation 
revocation are mostly silent with respect to the procedure or findings required prior to 
revocation. Idaho Code § 19-2603 gives the district court discretion to revoke probation 
if it “finds” the defendant violated his probation. Similarly, I.C. § 20-222 gives the district 
court discretion to revoke probation “after summary hearing.” Read together, these 
statutes recognize that a finding must be made prior to revocation, and that revocation 
is discretionary. See State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 381 (Ct. App. 1994) (“Consistent 
with the principles of due process, a court may revoke probation only upon evidence 
that the probationer has in fact violated the terms or conditions of probation.”). But, 
again, neither statute gives any guidance for the district court’s finding determination. 
 I.C.R. 33(f) fills in this gap. It provides:    
The court shall not revoke probation except after a hearing at which the 
defendant shall be present and apprised of the grounds on which such 
action is proposed. The defendant may be admitted to bail pending such 
hearing. The court shall not revoke probation unless there is an admission 
by the defendant or a finding by the court, following a hearing, that the 
defendant willfully violated a condition of probation. 
 
I.C.R. 33(f) (emphasis added). The last sentence of this rule explicitly requires the 
defendant to admit, or the district court to find, a willful violation before the district court 
revokes probation.3 In other words, the district court cannot revoke probation if 
                                            
3 I.C.R. 33(f) was amended in 2012 to add this last sentence. Compare I.C.R. 33(e) 
(West 2011), with I.C.R. 33(e) (West 2012). With regard to the “willful” addition, the 
Criminal Rules Advisory Committee Meeting minutes explain:  
 
The Committee considered whether this rule should be amended to 
reiterate that a violation of probation must be willful. This is already the law 
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probation was not “willfully violated.” Thus, I.C.R. 33(f) explains what is required before 
the district court exercises its discretion under the statutes to revoke probation: it must 
find the violation willful.  
 “When a statute and rule ‘can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no 
conflict between them, they should be so interpreted rather than interpreted in a way 
that results in a conflict.’” State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 974 (2008) (quoting State v. 
Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 543 (1985) (Bakes, J., dissenting)). “The interpretation of 
statutes and judicial rules is . . . a matter of free review.”  State v. Herrera, 149 Idaho 
216, 222 (Ct. App. 2009). As explored above, I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603, and 20-222 
and I.C.R. 33(f) can be reasonably interpreted so there is no conflict between them. 
First, the statutes allow the district court to issue a warrant for any alleged probation 
violation—willful or not. Second, the district court must have a summary hearing and 
make a finding on the alleged violation. If the district court finds that the violation was 
willful, it may revoke probation. If the district court finds that the violation was non-willful, 
it may not revoke probation and must use alternative measures to address the violation. 
This interpretation gives effect to all three statutes and I.C.R. 33(f), and it comports with 
due process. In fact, permitting the district court to revoke probation for any alleged 
violation, without a finding of willfulness, could run contrary to the due process clause of 
                                                                                                                                            
but some have been concerned about revocation of probation, particularly 
in the area of nonpayment of fines, without a finding that it was a willful 
violation, especially since no finding of ability to pay is required before a 
fine is imposed. The Committee voted in favor of recommending the rule 
be amended as follows: . . . . 
 
Criminal Rules Advisory Committee Meeting, September 16, 2011, p.6, available at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20121124030113/http:/www.isc.idaho.gov/orders/minutes/I
CR_CriminalMediationCommittee_09.16.11.pdf.  
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the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672–73 (1983) 
(imprisoning an indigent defendant “solely because he lacks funds to pay the fine,” 
without considering the reasons for the inability to pay or examining alternatives, is 
constitutionally impermissible); State v. Dabney, 159 Idaho 790, 796–97 (discussing 
Bearden); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 606, 608–09 (Ct. App. 2007) (same). Because 
I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603, and 20-222, and I.C.R. 33(f) can be interpreted without a 
conflict, they must be interpreted as such. Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974. The State’s 
challenge to the “willful” requirement in I.C.R. 33(f) therefore fails.  
 Although Mr. Garner asserts that the statutes and the rule plainly require a willful 
violation to revoke probation, Mr. Garner joins the State’s request for the Idaho 
Supreme Court to retain this case. He submits that the Court’s guidance is warranted 
because the existing case law has not addressed the willful requirement added to I.C.R. 
33(f) in 2012. As recently as 2014, in State v. Easley, the Court acknowledged that the 
district court could revoke probation even if the violation was not willful. The Court 
stated:  
 In reviewing a probation revocation proceeding, we use a two-step 
analysis. First, we ask whether the defendant violated the terms of his 
probation. If it is determined that the defendant has in fact violated the 
terms of his probation, the second question is what should be the 
consequences of that violation. . . .  
 The applicable legal standard the district court must utilize in 
determining whether to revoke probation is based upon whether the 
violation was willful or non-willful. If a knowing and intentional probation 
violation has been proved, a district court’s decision to revoke probation 
will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. However, if a probationer’s 
violation of a probation condition was not willful, or was beyond the 
probationer’s control, a court may not revoke probation and order 
imprisonment without first considering alternative methods to address the 
violation. 
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156 Idaho 214, 222–23 (2014) (quoting State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009)). 
This discussion indicates that the district court can revoke probation for a non-willful 
violation as long as it first considers, and rejects, the alternatives. The Easley opinion 
did not discuss the 2012 amendment to I.C.R. 33(f), however. And the case relied on by 
Easley for the application legal standards for revocation, Sanchez, was decided before 
the willful requirement was added to I.C.R. 33(f) in 2012. To resolve this apparent 
conflict between the existing case law and I.C.R. 33(f), Mr. Garner also respectfully 
requests that this Court retain this case.    
 Finally, for the reasons stated in his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Garner maintains that 
the evidence was insufficient for the district court to find he willfully violated the terms of 
his probation. (Revised App. Br., pp.3–10.) Further, the district court did not act 
consistently with the applicable legal standards because it did not make a willfulness 
finding, as required by I.C.R. 33(f). The district court never found the violations were 
willful, only to be “true.” (See Tr. Vol. I,4 p.59, L.14–p.63, L.25 (district court’s ruling).) As 
such, this case should be remanded for a new revocation hearing because it is unclear 
the district court would have revoked Mr. Garner’s probation but-for the unsubstantiated 
violations. Alternatively, this case should be remanded for a new disposition hearing for 
a proper discretionary determination of willfulness under I.C.R. 33(f). See State v. 
Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 276 (Ct. App. 1995) (“When a discretionary ruling has been 
tainted by legal or factual error,” the appellate courts “ordinarily vacate the decision and 
remand the matter for a new, error-free discretionary determination by the trial court.”). 
                                            
4 There are two transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the 
probation violation evidentiary hearing. The second, cited as Volume II, contains the 
probation disposition hearing. 
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Finally, Mr. Garner asserts that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his 
probation and executing his sentence, assuming in arguendo the probation violations 
were supported with sufficient evidence. (Revised App. Br., pp.11–12.) 
 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Garner respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s 
amended judgment and commitment in both cases and remand the cases to the district 
court for a new probation violation evidentiary hearing or disposition hearing. 
 DATED this 22nd day of July, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      JENNY C. SWINFORD 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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